

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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P R 051410Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1912

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

UFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2982

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 9352

EXDIS

(CORRECTED COPY - E.O., TAGS, AND SUBJECT LINE OBTAINED FROM  
ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION)

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET RELATIONS: DETENTE AT MIDYEAR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. SUMMARY - THE SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY EMPHAZIZING THE IMPORTANCE  
OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH US, ARE CODDLING AMERICAN VISITORS, AND  
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ARE GOIN LIGHT ON THEIR PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT

THEY ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT POST-VIETNAM AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO IMPROVING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AND THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN EVIDENT BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. NOW MORE THAN EVER, THEY ARE BEING MADE AWARE OF TWO BASIC FACTORS WHICH INHIBIT THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF US-SOVIET COOPERATION. THE FIRST FACTOR -- REINFORCED BY THE FAILURE OF THE EMIGRATION ISSUE TO DIE -- IS A DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION AS TO HOW MUCH INFLUENCE THIS MATTER SHOULD HAVE ON THE OVERALL CONDUCT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS. SOVIET-US DIFFERENCES OVER EMIGRATION WERE PARTICULARLY EVIDENT DURING THE RECENT VISIT BY 14 US SENATORS; IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT ANY COMPROMISE ON THE JACKSON AMENDMENT WHICH CALLED FOR A PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THEM OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TRADE AND EMIGRATION. THE SECOND FACTOR -- DRAMATIZED BY THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM AND PORTUGAL -- IS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW OVER THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY DETENTE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA. WHILE SOME FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS ARE POSSIBLE, THE SOVIETS ARE PERHAPS COMING TO REALIZE THAT ESSENTIALLY THESE DIFFERENCES MAY BE IRRECONCILABLE. THIS WILL NOT DEFLECT THEM FROM THEIR DETENTE COURSE. BUT IT MAKES THEM NERVOUS TO THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY BE DRAWING THE SAME SOBER CONCLUSIONS ABOUT INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIETIES, AND THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT A US RETREAT FROM DETENTE. FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW, THEIR CONCERN IS NOT UNHEALTHY, SINCE IT REMINDS THEM OF THE DANGERS OF PRESSING ON US TOO NARROW A VIEW OF DETENTE IN DISREGARD OF U.S. VALUE AND INTERESTS. END SUMMARY

2. WE MAY BE IN A NEW STAGE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN APRIL, THE SOVIETS, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, HAVE MAINTAINED AN ATTITUDE OF POSITIVE FORBEARANCE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. LIKE THE OLD SONG, THEY HAVE ACCENTUATED THE POSITIVE WHILE DOWNPLAYING (BUT NOT ELIMINATING) THE NEGATIVE. THEY APPLIED A TENDER MESSAGE TO A GROUP OF US GOVERNORS VISITING IN MAY. THEY GAVE A PREDICTABLY CRITICAL CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (CODEL EILBERG) VIRTUALLY ALL THE HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS SOUGHT, AND DID NOT COMPLAIN PUBLICLY WHEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION SAID ON RETURN THAT THEIR ADVERSE VIEW OF SOVIET EMIGRATION PRACTICES HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT OF THE VISIT. THEY CHARMED A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF AMERICANS IN TOWN FOR A DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE MEETING (INVITING BETE NOIRE

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ZBIGNIEW BREZIEZINSKI TO RETURN SOON FOR A LONGER VISIT EVEN WHILE HE WAS BEING ATTACKED IN THE PAGES OF LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.). THE LARGE HUMPHREY-SCOTT SENATORIAL DELEGATION RECEIVED AN ALL-STOP-OUT HOSPITALITY EFFORT, AND THE SAME WILL PROBABLY BE TRUE FOR THE DELEGATION LED BY REP. ALBERT, WHICH COMES IN AUGUST.

3. THERE HAS BEEN A RENEWED PUBLIC SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONSHIP. BREZHNEV STRUCK THAT

NOTE IN HIS MAY 8 30TH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH AS WELL AS IN HIS JUNE 13 ELECTORAL SPEECH. SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV ECHOED IT IN THEIR REMARKS TO THE SENATE DELEGATION. INDEED SUSLOV'S VERY PRESENCE WAS A SIGNAL OF SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP, AS OF COURSE WAS THE GROUP'S RECEPTION BY BREZHNEV AND THE HEAVY PRESS PLAY TO THE VISIT. POSITIVE REFERENCE TO A BREZHNEV VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE FALL IS NOW A STAPLE ITEM IN THE PRESS AND ON THE PROPAGANDA LECTURE CIRCUIT. COLOR STORIES ON BILATERAL COOPERATION -- EXEMPLIFIED BY ATTENTION TO THE APOLLO-SOYUZ PREPARATIONS AND BY MASSIVE PLAY TO THE RE-ENACTMENT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO OF A SOVIET AVIATOR'S 1937 TRANS-POLAR FLIGHT TO VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON -- ARE ON THE ASCENDANCY. AND, ON THE NUTS-AND-BOLTS KINDS OF CONCERNS, THERE SEEMS A SOVIET DESIRE TO BE ACCOMMODATING; FOR EXAMPLE, THE MFA GRANTED THE AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST TO ATTEND THE SOYUZ LAUNCH AT BAIKONUR AND FACILITATED THE APPROVAL OF PRIME TV TIME FOR A SHORT SPEECH ON JULY 4.

4. INTERNATIONALLY, ALSO, SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE BEEN PULLING THEIR STANDARD PUNCHES ON SUBJECTS AFFECTING US INTERESTS. THERE CONTINUES TO BE NOTICEABLE RELUCTANCE TO CROW OVER THE U.S. SETBACK IN INDOCHINA. U.S. DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS NOT BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET CRITICISM FOR SOME WEEKS. DISPARAGING REFERENCES TO THE SECRETARY HAVE DROPPED FROM VIEW. CRITICAL ARTICLES ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE DIMINISHED. AND ON OTHER ISSUES RELEVANT TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS -- E.G., BERLIN, PORTUGAL, AND CYPRUS -- THE SOVIET PRESS HAS KEPT THE TONE MODULATED AND THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION MINIMAL. THE OVERALL PICTURE, AS USUAL, IS MIXED. THE STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER GO FULL AND NEGATIVE COVERAGE. THE ALLEGED MACHINATIONS OF THE CIA, BASED ON US PRESS STORIES, CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED. AND, MOST IMPORTANT, PUBLICATION OF THE SUSLOV SPEECH TO THE SENATORS SPREAD ON THE RECORD A NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND U.S. POLICIES. BUT IN GENERAL, WE  
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ARE IN A COMPARATIVELY MELLOW PERIOD IN TERMS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO US.

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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5. THERE SEEM SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS. ONE OBVIOUS EXPLANATION IS THAT, UNTIL CSCE IS OVER, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO DO ANYTHING THAT COULD COMPLICATE ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE SOVIET NEED, IN THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY, TO SHOW CONTINUAL SUCCESS IN THEIR "PEACE" POLICY. THE KREMLIN HAS A CONCOMITANT RELUCTANCE TO DWELL ON AREAS WHERE THAT POLICY HAS BEEN LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL. IN EFFECT, THIS A DETENTE DIVIDEND FOR THE UNITED STATES -- IT WOULD NOT HAVE OPERATED ON THE SOVIETS NEARLY SO STRONGLY BEFORE 1972 -- THOUGH IT IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY TRANSLATABLE INTO BILATERAL BENEFITS FOR US. ANOTHER PRINCIPAL REASON FOR MOSCOW'S  
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RELATIVE PATIENCE IS THAT IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD IN AMERICA, THE SOVIETS SEEM MORE THAN NORMALLY WORRIED THAT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DETENTE MAY FLAG, AND THEY DO NOT WANT TO ASSIST THAT PROCESS.

6. OUR SOVIET CONTACTS WHO FOLLOW THE U.S. PROFESS TO DETECT A MORE MILITANT TONE IN SEVERAL OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S

STATEMENTS. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO FEAR THAT THE VIETNAM COLLAPSE HAS HELPED IN TURNING U.S. POLICY, INCLUDING THE SENTIMENT IN CONGRESS, MORE HAWKISH; THEY HAVE NOTED THE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE DEFENSE BUDGET. THE DECISION TO BAR SOVIET DELEGATES TO THE CPUSA CONVENTION DESPITE DOBRYNIN'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION HAS BEEN NOTED, AS HAVE VARIOUS PRESS ARTICLES SOURCED TO THE FBI AND PENTAGON ACCUSING THE SOVIETS (NOT WITHOUT CAUSE) OF VARIOUS MACHINATIONS. THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION HERE THAT THE SOVIET ACTION IN JANUARY TO REFUSE MFN AND CREDITS -- SO BRAVELY DEPICTED IN THE DOMESTIC PRESS AS A DECISIVE REBUFF TO THOSE WHO WOULD MEDDLE IN SOVIET AFFAIRS -- HAS HAD LITTLE APPRECIABLE EFFECT IN REDUCING CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS ON EMIGRATION AND HAS APPARENTLY NOT MARKEDLY CLIPPED SENATOR JACKSON'S WINGS. THE VISIT OF THE HUMPHREY-SCOTT DELEGATION CAN ONLY HAVE CONFIRMED SOVIET FEARS THAT CONGRESS WILL NOT DECOUPLE TRADE FROM THE EMIGRATION ISSUE. THERE ARE GATHERING DOUBTS ABOUT PRESIDENT FORD'S POLITICAL FEELINGS ABOUT THE USSR, ABOUT HIS COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, AND ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE CONGRESS. THE 1976 ELECTIONS ARE A SOURCE OF CONCERN. THE SOVIET FAVORITE IS KENNEDY; THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER PRESIDENT FORD TO ANY OTHER DEMOCRAT; BUT THEY SEEM LESS SURE OF THEIR CONVICTION EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT SENATOR JACKSON CANNOT MAKE IT. FINALLY, THEY ARE RESENTFUL AT THE DEGREE TO WHICH DEVELOPMENTS FOR WHICH THEY HOLD THEMSELVES BLAMELESS -- VIETNAM, PORTUGAL -- GET DRAGGED INTO THE AMERICAN DEBATE ABOUT DETENTE. BREZHNEV'S JUNE 13 ELECTION SPEECH CLEARLY REFLECTED THIS CURRENT SOVIET AMBIVALENCE. THE SPEECH'S OVERT RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. TO THE SOVIET UNION WAS A COUNTERPOINT TO ITS IMPLIED CONCERN ABOUT THE WAY THE U.S. MAY BE HEADED.

7. WE SUSPECT THAT SUCH DOUBTS ARE LEADING THE SOVIETS TOWARD A FRESH APPRECIATION OF SOME OF THE BASIC OBSTACLES TO MAKING U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE TRULY "IRREVERSIBLE". THE MOST IMPORTANT ZONE OF INCOMPATIBILITY RELATES, OF COURSE, TO THE EMIGRATION ISSUE.  
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WHILE ONLY TIME WILL TELL, WE DO NOT SHARE THE OPTIMISM OF SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HUMPHREY-SCOTT DELEGATION THAT THE FRANK EXCHANGES OVER EMIGRATION HAVE PERHAPS NARROWED THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

8. MOSCOW HAS TRIED TWO APPROACHES ON EMIGRATION. FROM THE KREMLIN'S VANTAGE POINT, ITS MAJOR CONCESSIONS OF 1971-73 ONLY WHETTED DEMANDS BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WHICH THE SOVIETS DECIDED WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO FULFILL. THEY THEREFORE FELT IT NECESSARY TO TAKE A "PRINCIPLED" POSITION WHICH REJECTED LINKAGE BETWEEN EMIGRATION AND OTHER BILATERAL PROBLEMS. THEIR INITIAL HOPE WAS THAT THIS CHANGE OF APPROACH WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO CONGRESS THAT THEY COULD NOT BE PRESSURED AND THAT, ONCE THE LESSON SANK IN, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO GET MFN AND CREDITS WITHOUT TAKING THE LID OFF

THEIR EMIGRATION POLICIES. THEY FELT THAT THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THIS STEP ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD BE HELD IN CHECK AND THAT, IF CURRENT EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION DID NOT PAN OUT, A NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1976 WOULD BE IMPELLED BY THE LOGIC OF THE SITUATION TO FIND SOME NEW ANSWERS.

9. THE SENATORIAL VISIT WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL IN HELPING EACH SIDE TO COME TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER'S POSITION ON EMIGRATION. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS TOOK POSITIVE NOTE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATED INTENTION TO SEEK LEGISLATION TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM AND OF SENATOR JAVITS' PLEDGE TO DO ALL THE COULD TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ALSO COULD NOT FAIL TO REGISTER THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE FEELING IN THE SENATE ON EMIGRATION RUNS DEEP. THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT THE GRANTING OF MFN OR CREDITS COULD BE MADE INDEPENDENTLY OF SOME POSITIVE SOVIET GESTURE ON EMIGRATION. AND THERE WAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE USSR WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SUCH A GESTURE.

10. WHAT SORT OF LEGISLATION WOULD THE SOVIETS BUY? WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY COMPROMISE WHICH REQUIRES OF THEM FORMAL ACTION OR ASSURANCES REGARDING EMIGRATION. THEY CROSSED THAT PARTICULAR RUBICON IN JANUARY; WE CAN CURRENTLY ENVISAGE NO CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD RE-CROSS IT. FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER PATOLICHEV TOLD SENATORS PERCY, JAVITS AND RIBICOFF JULY 2 THAT WE MUST EITHER FIND SOMETHING OTHER THAN EMIGRATION TO LINK TRADE TO OR ELSE UNLINK TRADE  
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COMPLETELY. REPEAL OF THE STEVENSON AMENDMENT SETTING A CREDIT CEILING WOULD NOT IN ITSELF BREAK THE IMPASSE, SINCE THE LANGUAGE REQUIRING A PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AND SOVIET ASSURANCES WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE. BEYOND THAT, THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED THAT THEIR FIRST PRIORITY IS MFN, AND THAT CREDITS ARE SECONDARY. NOR DO WE THINK IT AT ALL LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD OFFER CONGRESS A "SIGNAL" OF GOOD FAITH BY APPRECIABLY RAISING THE EMIGRATION FIGURES PRIOR TO ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. THEIR POSITION REMAINS THAT MOVEMENT IS UP TO CONGRESS, NOT TO THEM, AND WE STRONGLY DOUBT THAT THEY WILL DEPART FROM THAT POSITION.

11. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT RESPOND TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WHICH CARRIED ONLY AN IMPLICIT, BUT NOT AN EXPLICIT, LINKAGE BETWEEN TRADE AND EMIGRATION. A PARTIAL STEP (E.G., GRANTING MFN WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED BUT WITHOUT REMOVING THE EMIGRATION LINK TO CREDITS) MIGHT BRING SOME INCREASE IN THE EMIGRATION NUMBERS. IF SO, THE INCREASE WOULD PROBABLY BE DELAYED AND MINIMAL, SINCE THE SOVIETS WOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO PLAY DOWN THE CONNECTION WITH CONGRESS' ACTION. WE ARE NOT TOO OPTIMISTIC EVEN THAT SUCH LIMITED SOVIET ACTION

WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. WE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT SOME FORM OF ADMINISTRATION-BACKED COMPROMISE LEGISLATION WOULD BE HELPFUL, WHETHER IT ULTIMATELY SUCCEEDS OR NOT IN EVOKING A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE.

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ACTION SS-25

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12. A SECOND ZONE OF INCOMPATIBILITY, WHICH SEEMS TO BE RECEIVING MORE SOVIET ATTENTION, CONCERNS PROBLEMS INVOLVING ANCILLARY REGIONS OF THE WORLD IN WHICH U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS ARE IN BASIC CONFLICT. THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE US TO VIEW THEIR BEHAVIOR TOWARD BERLIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST -- REGIONS OF ACCEPTED CENTRAL INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES -- AS TESTS OF DETENTE. BUT THEY WERE SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK TO BE "BLAMED" BY LARGE SEGMENTS OF

AMERICAN OPINION FOR RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM AND PORTUGAL. THEY CONSIDER THAT THEY COULD HAVE DONE NO LESS FOR HANOI AND THAT THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF THE THIEU REGIME WAS CAUSED MORE BY THE FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO AID SAIGON THAN BY SOVIET SUPPORT FOR  
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NORTH VIETNAM. MOSCOW REGARDS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY AS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH DETENTE AND INDEED AS THE MINIMUM THAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM A GREAT POWER WHICH REGARDS ITSELF AS THE ROME FOR WORLD-WIDE COMMUNIST AND "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS. THUS THE SOVIETS RESENTED STATEMENTS IN THE U.S. PRESS THAT THE WEST SHOULD EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM THEM ON PORTUGAL IN EXCHANGE FOR ACQUIESCENCE IN A CSCE SUMMIT. DETENTE MAY TEMPER SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN SUCH REGIONS -- ARGUABLY, IT ALREADY HAS IN BOTH VIETNAM AND PORTUGAL -- BUT THE KREMLIN WILL REJECT ANY CLAIM THAT DETENTE REQUIRES IT TO ABANDON ITS HISTORIC MISSION.

13. THIS ISSUE WAS JOINED IN A DIALOGUE EARLY LAST MONTH BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PARTICIPANTS IN A DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE MEETING IN MOSCOW. THE AMERICANS QUOTED TO THEIR HOSTS AN ARTICLE BY A.I. SOVOLEV FROM THE JANUARY-FEBRUARY ISSUE OF A RATHER OBSCURE SOVIET JOURNAL (WORKING CLASS AND CONTEMPORARY WORLD) WHICH CONTENDED THAT DETENTE SHOULD BE SEEN AS PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AND THUS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR UNDERMINING CAPITALISM. TAKEN ABACK (NOT HAVING READ THE ARTICLE), THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS RETURNED THE NEXT DAY WITH A REBUTTAL. THE ARTICLE WAS WRONG AND ITS AUTHOR HAD ALREADY BEEN CRITICIZED, THEY SAID, FOR FAILING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IN CLAIMING THAT DETENTE (INTERNATIONAL) IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (INTERNAL). BUT, THE SOVIETS WENT ON, YOU AMERICANS ARE ALSO WRONG TO CLAIM THAT DETENTE HAS ANY RELEVANCE FOR VIETNAM AND PORTUGAL BEYOND KEEPING SUCH DEVELOPMENTS FROM PROVOKING INTERNATIONAL CONFRONTATIONS. VIETNAM AND PORTUGAL WERE BILLS WHICH ARE NOW COMING DUE; DETENTE IS INDEPENDENT OF THEM. THE WEST CLAIMS THAT, UNLESS THE INTERNAL STATUS QUO IS MAINTAINED, DETENTE CANNOT WORK. WE SOVIETS BELIEVE, THEY CONTINUED, THAT A WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IS GOING ON AND WE REJECT THE IDEA THAT DETENTE CAN OR MUST BE USED TO STOP IT. INDEED, THEY CONCLUDED, OUR VIEW IS THAT THIS IS A HISTORIC PROCESS WHICH CANNOT BE STOPPED.

14. IN BOTH THESE AREAS OF FRICTION -- THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA AND THE AREA OF DEFINING THE OBLIGATIONS OF DETENTE -- THERE CONTINUES TO BE A NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT BY BOTH SIDES. MOSCOW FEELS STRONGLY -- AND FROM ITS POINT OF VIEW QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY -- THAT THERE IS STILL TOO GREAT A TENDENCY IN THE U.S. TO LINK SOVIET DOMESTIC  
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BEHAVIOR TO BILATERAL COOPERATION AND THAT WASHINGTON WILL HAVE TO BE TAUGHT THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR BETWEEN GREAT POWERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT THAT AMERICANS CANNOT EASILY LOOK AT A POTENTIAL PARTNER'S FOREIGN POLICIES IN ISOLATION FROM ITS INTERNAL POLICIES. THE KREMLIN BELIEVES THAT WE ARE TOO INCLINED TO BLAME MOSCOW FOR ALL THINGS THAT GO WRONG AND TO IDENTIFY OUR INTERESTS NEEDLESSLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS QUO. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS MUST COME TO REALIZE THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, EVEN IN AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOT THE IDENTIFIABLE MAJOR ACTORS, WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. AND THEY MUST LEARN TO COPE WITH THE FACT THE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. IS INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL OF DETENTE AND TAKES A MORE PRONOUNCED "SHOW-ME" ATTITUDE IN ASSESSING ITS BENEFITS. WHATEVER ADJUSTMENTS ARE MADE, THE ISSUES ARE PROBABLY TOO FUNDAMENTAL FOR US REALISTICALLY TO EXPECT SEMINAL CHANGES FROM THIS GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS. A GULF WILL REMAIN. WITH THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE U.S.-SOVIT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES NOW PAST, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN FULLY TO GRASP -- EVEN WITH THE NEW BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -- HOW WIDE THAT GULF IS.

15. THIS INCREASINGLY SOBER ATTITUDE WILL NOT AFFECT THE KREMLIN'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO DETENTE WITH THE U.S. THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP IS STILL CRITICAL TO THE SOVIETS, AND THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO WARRANT THEIR TRYING TO GET THE MOST THEY CAN FROM IT. THE U.S.-SOVIET TIE IS UNQUESTIONABLY SEEN BY MOSCOW AS THE BASIC FOUNDATION OF AN OVERALL DETENTE POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY SUCCESSFUL FROM MOSCOW'S POINT OF VIEW. THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM GOING -- WITH SALT, MBFR, THE APOLLO-SOYUZ PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, AND BEYOND. THE MAIN SOVIET CONCERN IS NOT ABOUT THEIR OWN CONTINUED PURSUIT OF DETENTE; IT IS ABOUT OURS. THE U.S. NEED NOT BE DISTURBED BY THAT CONCERN. IN OUR VIEW IT DOES NOT HURT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS ON CONSTANT NOTICE THAT, IF THEY WANT FULL BENEFIT FROM DETENTE, THEY CANNOT DEFINE IT IN WAYS THAT IGNORE MAJOR U.S. VALUES OR INTERESTS.  
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